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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
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EC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 COPENHAGEN 0338

LIMDIS

BELGRADE FOR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEEC

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, EEC, DA

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S MEETINGS IN COPENHAGEN WITH EC
PRESIDENCY OFFICIALS

REF: COPENHAGEN 227 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: DURING THREE-DAY VISIT TO COPENHAGEN (JAN 13-15), AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HAD MEETINGS WITH PRIMIN JORGENSEN, FONMIN ANDERSEN, AND PRESS IN ADDITION TO DIALOGUE WITH DISTINGUISHED DANES IN FOREIGN POLICE ASSOCIATION AND LEADING DANISH PERSONALITIES IN PRIVATE SECTOR. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG GAVE DANES LATEST USG THINKING ON CSCE MEETINGS AND ASKED THEIR HELP IN PUTTING HIS POINTS ACROSS TO THEIR EC PARTNERS IN BELGRADE. DANES WERE HIGHLY PLEASED AND COMPLIMENTED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S VISIT. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HELD TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH FONMIN K.B. ANDERSEN, WHO WAS ASSISTED BY POL DIRECTOR OLE BIERRING, MFA EUROPEAN CHIEF WILLIAM FRIIS-MOLLER AND DANISH AMBASSADOR TO CSCE MELBIN. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR
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DEAN, DCM LUKENS AND POL COUNS RUSHING.

3. ANDERSEN OPENED MEETING WITH WARM GREETING AND WORDS OF APPRECIATION THAT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAKE BRIEF VISIT TO COPENHAGEN EN ROUTE BELGRADE. ANDERSEN OBSERVED THAT US AND EC VIEWPOINTS ON CSCE WERE NEARLY IDENTICAL. HE SAID THAT RESULTS THUS FAR WERE NOT ALL WE HAD WISHED FOR BUT THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON BASKET III AND HUMAN RIGHTS. CSCE IS LONG PROCESS AND EUROPE CANNOT BE CHANGED OVERNIGHT. FINAL PHASE OF CSCE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN EC POL DIRECTORS' MEETING WHICH HAD APPROVED REPORT LAYING OUT GUIDELINES (REFTEL). FURTHER WORK WILL BE DONE AT NEXT POL DIRECTORS' MEETING ON FEB 7-8, PRECEDED BY EC/CSCE EXPERTS ON FEB 6.

4. ANDERSEN SUMMARIZED AIMS OF EC-NINE IN FINAL BELGRADE PHASE. FIRST, MEETING SHOULD NOT BE UNNECESSARILY PROLONGED AND SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH. MEETING SHOULD STICK TO BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN

DONE RATHER THAN PRODUCE NEW PROPOSALS. AIMS SHOULD BE WELL SPELLED OUT IN FINAL DOCUMENT BUT NOT PHRASED IN OVER-AMBITIOUS WAY. IF SOVIETS PRESS FOR LONG ANODYNE DOCUMENT, NINE WOULD COUNTER WITH SHORT FACTUAL ONE, MERELY GIVING DATE AND PLACE OF NEXT MEETING. ANDERSEN THEN NOTED NEED FOR PUBLIC EXPLANATIONS IF ONLY SHORT ONE IS USED. AFTER SOVIETS' FIRST SPEECH, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHICH WAY IT WILL GO.

5. ANDERSEN COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH DENMARK WAS THOROUGHLY COMMITTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS, TACTICALLY GOAL IN CSCE IN THIS REGARD SHOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN HELSINKI ACT IN ALL ITS PARTS. IN
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OTHER WORDS, DETENTE SHOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY OVER-EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASKET III. REFERRING TO HIS SPEECH AT NATO MINISTERIAL, ANDERSEN ADID THAT THE CLOSER WE ARE TO REAL DETENTE, THE MORE IMPORTANT BECOME THE PRACTICAL STEPS ALONG THE WAY. BELGRADE SHOULD NOT UPSET THIS PROGRESS.

6. CONCERNING SITE AND VENUE OF NEXT CONFERENCE, EC-NINE SUPPORT MADRID IN 1980, BUT WOULD ALSO STRESS POINT THAT MEETING COULD, IF NECESSARY, BE HELD IN NATO OR WARSAW PACT CAPITAL. IT IS

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LIMDIS

NECESSARY TO SHOW SOVIET IN THIS REGARD THAT
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT POLITICAL DETENTE NEED NOT NECES-
SARILY BE HELD OUTSIDE TERRITORY OF TWO PACTS.
HOWEVER, EC-NINE DO SUPPORT MADRID AND UNDERSTAND
PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFIT TO DEVELOPING SPANISH DEMOCRACY.

7. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, AFTER THANKING DANES FOR
WARM WELCOME AND THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO EC
PRESIDENCY, MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ON CSCE. FIRST,
THERE ARE MANY ITEMS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN USG AND
EC-NINE; VERY FEW OF DISAGREEMENT. USG PREFERS,
HOWEVER, THAT THIS ROUND NOT BE PROLONGED BEYOND
MID-FEBRUARY, DESPITE HELSINKI CLUB'S PROCLIVITY
FOR OPEN-ENDED MEETING. THERE WAS QUID PRO QUO
WITH SOVIETS THAT WHEN WE AGREED TO RESUME MEETING
IT SHOULD END ON TIME. NEVERTHELESS, THE US WOULD
NOT OBJECT TO A BRIEF PROLONGATION, IF THE NINE SO

DESIRED.

8. SECOND, THE NEW PROPOSALS RECENTLY TABLED MUST NOT MEAN THAT FINAL ACT WILL BE PUSHED ASIDE. THIS IS FINE DOCUMENT WHICH CANNOT BE IMPROVED UPON AND IS TRIBUTE TO WESTERN DRAFTMANSHIP. THEREFORE, WE HAVE CHOICE BETWEEN SHORT CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OR LONGER, SUBSTANTIVE ONE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCES TO ALL SUBJECTS LIKE HUMAN RIGHTS WE HOLD TO BE IMPORTANT. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT LONG, ANODYNE, MEANINGLESS DOCUMENT. IN A LONGER PAPER, CONFIDENTIAL

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REFERENCE SHOULD ALSO BE MADE TO MONITORING GROUPS, FAMILY REUNIONS, BINATIONAL MESSAGES AND PERHAPS SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CARES, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING PROPOSALS, RELATING TO BASKET II OR CBMS.

9. SINCE SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT SUCH A LONG DOCUMENT, WE MAY WELL END UP WITH SHORT ONE. THIS MAY CAUSE PROBLEM SINCE BELGRADE PRESS COVERAGE HAS BEEN MINIMAL AND WESTERN PUBLIC DOES NOT UNDERSTAND REAL AIMS OF CONFERENCE. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO STRESS FACT THAT IMPORTANT WORK HAS BEEN DONE, THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING AND IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW, AND THAT EVEN IF THERE HAS NOT BEEN A THOROUGH DIALOGUE, THERE HAS BEEN MUCH EXPOSURE ON BOTH SIDES TO IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS.

10. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THEN REFERRED TO AN EARLIER EN-NINE IMPLEMENTATION PAPER AT BELGRADE, ON WHICH US DEL HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CONSULTED. PAPER DID NOT CONTAIN REFERENCE TO "SIGNAL WORDS", SUCH AS "HUMAN RIGHTS", AND IN THIS RESPECT WAS NOT ACCURATE AS REVIEW OF WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. IN SOME WAYS, IN FACT, IT WAS NO BETTER THAN THE NEUTRAL'S DOCUMENT.

11. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THEN ADDRESSED SUBJECT OF TIMEING AND VENUE OF NEXT CONFERENCE. HE WAS PLEASED THAT NINE SUPPORTED MADRID, BUT POINTED OUT THAT WESTERN CASE WOULD BE WEAKENED IF SOVIETS LEARNED WE WERE THINKING OF ALTERNATIVES. HE NOTED NEED TO HELP SPANIARDS AT THIS POINT AND CALLED FOR FIRMNESS TO PREVENT SOVIETS FROM USING WESTERN INDECISION AS EXCUSE NOT TO AGREE TO MADRID. HOWEVER, THE WEST COULD MAKE THE POINT WHICH FONMIN ANDERSEN HAD CONFIDENTIAL

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BROUGHT UP BY SAYING THAT THE CONFERENCE FOLLOWING MADRID COULD BE IN A NATO COUNTRY AND A LATER ONE IN WARSAW PACT CAPITAL.

12. AS FOR TIMING OF THE NEXT MEETING, GOLDBERG SAID THAT US HAD PROPOSED THE END OF 1979, BUT REALIZED THIS COULD BECOME 1980. IT SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED, HOWEVER, BEYOND THE SPRING OF 1980. CONCERNING LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT NEXT CONFERENCE, GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, AT LEAST FOR THE OPENING, AND THAT PERHAPS AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT, THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT COULD ALSO ATTEND.

13. GOLDBERG THEN NOTED NEED TO WRITE INTO FINAL DOCUMENT SOMETHING ABOUT "FREEDOM OF RELIGION". HOLY SEE HAD SUGGESTED LANGUAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT ANY PERSON OR GROUP PRACTICING RELIGION BE ACCORDED "SAME TREATMENT" AS OTHER GROUPS. GOLDBERG THOUGHT WORD "TREATMENT" COULD BE MISCONSTRUED AND THAT NEW LANGUAGE WAS NEEDED.

14. FINALLY, GOLDBERG STRESSED NEED FOR EC AND NATO COUNTRIES TO WORK OUT COMMON LANGUAGE THROUGH CAREFUL CONSULTATION. HE POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT THIS WAS A EUROPEAN, NOT A US, CONFERENCE AND THAT; THEREFORE, THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD, KEEPING IN MIND THE SPECIAL US CONCERNS LISTED ABOVE.

15. GOLDBERG THEN MENTIONED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE WITH A NUMBER OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS. THESE DISSIDENTS SAID THAT WEST HAD DONE WELL IN ITS APPROACH AND THAT IN GENERAL THE DISSIDENTS
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HAD BENEFITED BY THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THEM. THERE IS A DANGER THAT AS SOON AS THE CONFERENCE IS OVER THE SOVIETS WILL CLAMP DOWN BUT, ON THE WHOLE, MOST DISSIDENTS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE WEST WAS RIGHT TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON.

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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5732

EC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

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16. FONMIN ANDERSEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN COMMENTING ON AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S REMARKS: (1) THE CONFERENCE SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, END IN MID-FEBRUARY AND NOT BE OPEN-ENDED; (2) THE FINAL DOCUMENT WILL PROBABLY BE VERY BRIEF BUT CAREFUL THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN AS TO HOW TO EXPLAIN THIS TO THE PUBLIC; (3) ANDERSEN REALIZED THE NEED FOR FULL AND COMPLETE TWO-WAY CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US AND SAID THE NINE WOULD STRIVE FOR THIS IN THE FINAL BELGRADE SESSION; (4) ANDERSEN SUPPORTED GOLDBERG IN HIS CHOICE OF MADRID AND AGREED NOT TO BRING UP ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS AT THIS TIME; (5) HE AGREED TO THE DATE OF SPRING 1980; AND (6) HE NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS OVER THE LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAD BEEN SMALL BUT PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE DETENTE PROCESS. HE NOTED ESPECIALLY THE GERMAN DESIRE TO KEEP THE DOORS OPEN TO FOSTER REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES AND NOT TO OFFEND THE SOVIETS BY UNNECESSARY ARGUMENT.

17. THE MEETING WAS FOLLOWED BY A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE DURING WHICH ANDERSEN INTRODUCED GOLDBERG AND WENT ON TO STRESS THAT THE AIMS OF THE NINE AND THE USG WERE VERY SIMILAR. GOLDBERG COMMENTED HOW PLEASED HE WAS THAT DENMARK WOULD BE PRESIDING OVER THE NINE THIS SPRING AND IN THIS CAPACITY COULD BE HELPFUL DURING THE FINAL BELGRADE MEETING.
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IN ANSWER TO Q QUESTION BY THE REUTERS CORRESPONDENT, GOLDBERG SAID THAT THE US WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE DANISH DRAFT WHICH PROVIDES THE MODALITIES FOR THE NEXT MEETING. BOTH GOLDBERG AND ANDERSEN SAID THEY ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTED MADRID AS THE SITE FOR THE NEXT CONFERENCE. A COMMUNIST JOURNALIST ASKED ABOUT "HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE US", AND GOLDBERG WAS ABLE TO GIVE A CAREFUL EXPLANATION OF US PROGRESS IN THE AREA. AT THE END OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE ANDERSEN NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED TO SEE AMB GOLDBERG, HIS FORMER TEACHER AT THE SALZBURG SEMINAR.

18. THERE WAS A FINAL WORKING SESSION AFTER ANDERSEN'S DEPARTURE, MOSTLY CONCERNED WITH TACTICS AT BELGRADE. GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT THE WEST SHOULD HAVE HAD COMPLETE DRAFT VERSION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT READY TO SURFACE AFTER THE SOVIETS; INTENTIONS BECAME CLEAR. THE DECISION OF THE NINE, HOWEVER, IS NOT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DRAFT BUT A SERIES OF

PAPERS DESIGNED TO ELICIT A SOVIET RESPONSE. ANSWERING A QUESTION BY AMB BIERRING ON RUSSIAN ATTITUDES, GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT AFTER THE USUAL AMOUNT OF SQUABBLING, THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO A FINAL DOCUMENT. THEY HAVE TOO MUCH TIED UP IN THE CONFERENCE NOT TO MOVE AHEAD. THEY DO NOT SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE OR LACK OF IT WILL AFFECT THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US. BASICALLY, THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE NEGOTIATED SOLELY WITH THE US IN BELGRADE, BUT GOLDBERG SAID HE WOULD NOT LET THEM AS IT WAS A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. AMB MELBIN SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE A LONG-TERM INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE, AND THAT THEY WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY PUSH FOR A FULL DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL OF THEIR GRANDIOSE PROPOSALS. AGAIN, GOLDBERG NOTED THE PROBLEM WITH A LONG DOCUMENT WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO SEE FULL OF GENERALITIES BUT WHERE WE WOULD NEED TO SEE SPECIFIC POINTS LIKE HUMAN RIGHTS LISTED.

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19. GOLDBERG MENTIONED THE NEUTRAL "GRID" WHICH CALLED FOR ONLY FOUR WEEKS OF MEETINGS AND A FINAL WEEK OF SPEECHES. HE SUGGESTED THAT MOST OF WESTERN LEADERSHIP OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE IN DANISH HANDS (AS EC PRESIDENT) BUT THAT IT WOULD HELP TO HAVE A NATO MEMBER AS A CO-DRAFTER. MELBIN SUGGESTED CANADA WHICH GOLDBERG THOUGHT WAS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. GOLDBERG HOPED THAT THE EC-NATO DRAFTING GROUP WOULD BE THE ONLY ONE ON THE WESTERN SIDE, AS TOO MANY DIFFERENT DRAFTING GROUPS ALWAYS CAUSE CONFUSION. GOLDBERG STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US AND OTHER NATO MEMBERS IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS.

20. THE MEETING THEN TURNED TO THE NEED TO SQUELCH THE MALTESE. THEY HAD BECOME A NUISANCE AND THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT SOMEONE HAD TO LEAN ON THEM. GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT MAYBE THE POLISH REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT BE THE BEST ONE. THE RUSSIANS WERE IN A DILEMMA BECAUSE THEY DISLIKED THE MALTESE, BUT THEY MIGHT STILL FISH IN MUDDY WATERS BY USING THE MALTESE TO STIR UP TROUBLE.

21. THE MEETING THEN DISCUSSED THE RUSSIAN CBM PROPOSAL FOR A 60,000-MAN CEILING ON TROOP MANEUVERS. GOLDBERG SAID HE WAS STILL WAITING FOR A VIEW ON THIS PROPOSAL FROM THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE. EVEN IF THE WEST HAS NO OBJECTION TO THIS PROPOSAL,
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GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED OUTRIGHT BUT USED INSTEAD AS A TRADE-OFF. PERHAPS THE NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL COULD BE PART OF THE TRADE-OFF.

2. IN CONCLUSION, GOLDBERG NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF USEFUL SUMMARY STATEMENTS IN THE CLOSING PLENARY SESSIONS. IF NOTHING IS SAID ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT, THE US WOULD PLAN TO USE THE CLOSING SESSION TO STRESS THE NEED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ON INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS. (POINTS MADE ABOVE WERE LATER CABLED BY DANISH MFA TO THEIR MISSIONS IN OTHER EC COUNTRIES SO THAT COORDINATED POSITION CAN BE ACHIEVED WHEN SESSION OPENS JAN 17).

23. ON JAN 13 PRIMIN ANKER JØRGENSEN CAME TO THE RESIDENCE TO VISIT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, HIS OLD TEACHER AT THE SALZBURG SEMINAR. IN AN HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION, MOSTLY ON OTHER SUBJECTS, GOLDBERG MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON CSCE:

A. HE REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO STAND TOGETHER IN THE FINAL SESSION OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE. HE NOTED THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES TO STAND UP TO THE SOVIETS AND THOUGHT THIS WAS A MISTAKE. HIS OWN ACTIONS AT BELGRADE HAD REFLECTED HIS FEELINGS ON THIS POINT.

B. GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN BELGRADE WAS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT BILATERAL US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS LIKE SALT. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO NEED TO BE FRIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AT BELGRADE WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT IN OTHER WAYS.

C. WE OWE IT TO THOSE WHO HAVE STOOD UP FOR WHAT WAS SET FORTH IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO
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OBLIGE THE SOVIETS TO LIVE UP TO THEIR COMMITMENTS.

D. GOLBERG SUGGESTED THAT IN THE EVENT THAT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE CONCLUDED WITH ONLY A BRIEF DOCUMENTS, THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A COMMON STATEMENT BY THE WESTERN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT COMMENTING ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. THE PRIMIN DID NOT APPEAR TO BE UNRECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA.

24. FINALLY, THE PRIMIN NOTED THAT THE DANES AND THE GERMANS LOOKED AT BELGRADE IN A SIMILAR

WAY, ALTHOUGHT THE GERMANS HAD THE SPECIAL PROBLEM
OF KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN TO ALLOW GERMANS FROM THE
EAST TO MOVE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

25. COMMENT: GOLDBERG'S VISIT WAS MCUH APPRECIATED
BY THE DANES AND CAME AT A MOST OPPORTUNE MOMENT.
IN ADDITION TO OFFICIAL MEETINGS NOTED ABOVE,
GOLDBERG HAD FRUITFUL DIALOGUE WITH TWO DOZEN DISTINGUISHED
DANES AT DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS AND THROUGH THEM
WAS ABLE TO REACH IMPORTANT DANISH OPINION LEADERS.
THE DANES CONSIDERED THE VISIT TO BE HIGHLY
SUCCESSFUL AND WERE COMPLIMENTED AND PLEASED THAT
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG TOOK TIME TO VISIT COPENHAGEN
ON HIS RETURN TO BELGRADE.
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978COPENH00338
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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: ALSO FOR USEEC
Executive Order: GS
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Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
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Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Reference: 78 COPENHAGEN 227
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 apr 2005
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Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S MEETINGS IN COPENHAGEN WITH EC PRESIDENCY OFFICIALS
TAGS: OCON, MARR, DA, US, CSCE, EEC, (GOLDBERG, ARTHUR)
To: STATE EC COLLECTIVE
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